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are to buy the pentagon didn't show you any video of things that miss. that is bad pr. and the percentage of weapons that were smart weapons in the first gulf war but infinitely more than anything the iraqis had was remarkably small compared to the impression the pentagon gave them a military briefing for the alicia pictures of smart bombs and smart missiles and things fly into windows. that was the percentage actually expended. so i don't think this is a revolution in military affairs so much as a vivid demonstration of just how proficient the united states was in waging war, especially can do this proficient adversary. but it also is a military affairs in a fundamentalist about is the car still has a boat here and the ultimate goal of the conflict was a political goal and therefore the military plan made that involve smart and weapons were designed with a traditional military conclusion, which in truth is not revolutionary at all, getting the enemy to do what she wanted. i can't see it as fares. and getting assigned from the back right of time, but i do want to give -- >> yet, let randy
but the second two points the pentagon did not show you any video the percentage of footprints that were smart well infinitely more than what the iraqis had was small compared to the impression the pentagon gave we're the only showed pictures, that was a tiny percentage. so i don't think this was a revolution as you pointed out just how proficient united states was in waging war with a less proficient adversary. in the more philosophical and fundamental way that the ultimate goal of the conflict was a political goal so the military planning with the air war were designed with a traditional military conclusion which in truth was not revolutionary at all so i cannot see it in revolutionary affairs i do see we're running at a time by one to give him a chance to comment. >> as i alluded to the revolutionary of military affairs the something that came at the time goldwater nichols was passed to join the military and was all that was talked about back in the '80s and what it meant to me is finally, coming at a vietnam , we had thinkers in the military said said it worked through what it takes to wag
alv vast network of oldot colleagues throughout the pentagon bureaucracy. he's reaching out to them.s he deliberately forms a back v channel. he cultivates this woman in the white house named megyn to o'sullivan who is president bush's every chief adviser in the national security council. he sees she's kind of wavering. l security council and seized she is wavering and they're talking on the phone practically every day. this is outrageous. a three-star general from fort wet weather worsened talking on the phone every day with the senior advisor to the president of the united states general casey you is a four-star general commanding troops he says we only need one more brigade so those are arguments why it isn't enough so when it comes, by the way it is not paula bridewell but strictly professional. but subverting the chain of command he always has been off the reservation guy to do what is necessary here but at the same time a civilian analyst used to teach history he rode a steady advocating the surge at the american enterprise institute. said to get this into the warehouse into t
get it worse? i worked in the pentagon. it would have made it a lot better. so we realized you really have to go after the people who do the work, people who do logistics, communications, pass information, do car bombs, you have to take those out. we came up with a strategy, philadelphia would love this. it is like rocky balboa and apollo creed. we'll hit them in the midsection and hit them a lot. from august of 2004 when we did 18 raids, two years, later, same month, same force, same fight, we were doing 300 raids a month. that was ten a night. now, if you stop and you say, well, ten a night, that's a lot, that's impressive. that means every raid guy on the force is going on a raid at least one raid every night. every pilot's flying one or 2:00 raids every night. and these raids are not patrols. this is not with foot, these are going in the door, somebody is getting shot. extraordinary, and to do that though you can't use previous systems. one you've got to be able to bring in this intelligence on an industrial scale. you have got to be able -- we got to the point where instead of th
, first of all, the pentagon didn't show you any video of things that missed. that's bad pr. and the percentage of weapons that were smart weapons in the first gulf war while infinitely more than anything the iraqis had was remarkably small compared to the impression the pentagon gave in their military briefings where they'd only show pictures of smart bombs and smart missiles and things flying through windows. that was a very, very tiny percentage of the munitions actually expended. so i don't think this was so much a revolution in military affairs so much as a vivid demonstration, as you point out, of just how proficient the united states was in waging war especially against a less proficient adversary. but it also was military affairs in a more philosophical, fundamental way, and that is claus wits still has a vote here, and the ultimate goal of the conflict was a political goal and, therefore, the military planning and the air war being a classic case in point of this were designed with a traditional military conclusion which in truth was not revolutionary at all which w
a vast network of old colleagues throughout the pentagon bureaucracy. is reaching out to them. he deliberately forms a back channel. he cultivates this woman in the white house named meghan o'sullivan who was president bush's chief adviser on iraq in the national security council. he sees she's waving from the policy, he cultivates her. they're talking on the phone practically every day. now, picture this. this is kind of average. his petraeus, a three-star general in fort leavenworth. is talking on the phone everyday with the senior advisor to the president of united states. she will be asking him, general casey who is a four-star general actually commanding troop in iraq if general casey as we only need one more brigade, what do you think with an petraeus would muster these arguments that she could funnel to her seniors on why this really isn't enough. so, you know, when he comes to washington and meets in restaurants -- by the way, this is not, this is strictly professional. can you imagine, this is someone, essentially subverting the chain of command, getting his own views acr
to get this into the warehouse into the pentagon to some of these subordinates in iraq so basically by the time the trade is becomes the commander everything is lined up to impose a strategy with the united states government this is not a coincidence, it is very exclusively coordinated. what does he do? one thing that is already starting to have been is this is a pivotal moment serial iraq and allied with al qaeda, it goes several steps to fire their getting upset and one to break with al qaeda and there is a criminal named shawn mcfarland to canada this group to switch to our side to fight but the trieste's realizes what is going on to apply this struck the country and does this by setting up a program called the sons of iraq. he pays them out of the commander discretionary fund. with a neighborhood watch those who have been shooting at american's two weeks earlier and at the same time he needs to go after the militia prime minister maliki told the prime minister's day at of sadr city now in some kind of alliance he just send these guys in and does not wait for approval. there is a
that decision. so the president or someone in the pentagon makes a call and there's no oversight to make sure that the person they've targeted actually should have been targeted. >> stephanie: you know, i guess, again, it becomes this moral equivalence, i suppose of again, i was saying here we are coming out of the bush years where we had this completely unnecessary war in iraq. took our eye off the ball in afghanistan. that war dragged on and on. i think there's that argument people are making that a lot less people are dying. when the president talked about having a smarter -- tough but smarter foreign policy, in some ways you go boy i wish we could have gotten bin laden before we lost all of these people on both sides in afghanistan, right? >> right. that's exactly right. i think that generally obama's foreign policy has been smart. i think that the attack on bin laden was an example of a targeted killing. that was justified. and you know, targeted killings aren't new. admiral yamamoto was the senior most commander of japanese naval forces in world war ii. we got intelligence that he was g
the enemy didn't have. but the second two points i think at that first of all the pentagon didn't show you any video of things it missed. that's bad pr. and the percentage of weapons that were smart weapons in the first gulf war while infinitely anything more than the iraqis had was remarkably small. compared to the impression the pentagon gave in the military briefings where they only showed pictures of smart bombs and smart missiles seen flying through windows. that was a very, very tiny percentage of the munitions actually expend. so i don't think this is so much a revolution of military affairs so much as a vivid demonstration as you pointed out as just a proficient at united states was in waging war, especially against a less proficient adversary. but it also was a military affairs, and that is the ultimate goal of the conflict was a political goal. and so, therefore, the military planning that involve both smart and dumb weapons in a war where design with a traditional military conclusion, which in truth was not revolution at all which was getting the enemy to do what you wanted. so
Search Results 0 to 8 of about 9